As new technologies such as the Internet of Things (IoT) are integrated into Critical National Infrastructures (CNI), new cybersecurity threats emerge that require specific security solutions. Approaches used for analysis include the modelling and simulation of critical infrastructure systems using attributes, functionalities, operations, and behaviours to support various security analysis viewpoints, recognising and appropriately managing associated security risks. With several critical infrastructure protection approaches available, the question of how to effectively model the complex behaviour of interconnected CNI elements and to configure their protection as a system-of-systems remains a challenge. Using a systematic review approach, existing critical infrastructure protection approaches (tools and techniques) are examined to determine their suitability given trends like IoT, and effective security modelling and analysis issues. It is found that empirical-based, agent-based, system dynamics-based, and network-based modelling are more commonly applied than economic-based and equation-based techniques, and empirical-based modelling is the most widely used. The energy and transportation critical infrastructure sectors reflect the most responsive sectors, and no one Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) approach -tool, technique, methodology or framework -provides a 'fit-for-all' capacity for all-round attribute modelling and simulation of security risks. Typically, deciding factors for CIP choices to adopt are often dominated by trade-offs between 'complexity of use' and 'popularity of approach', as well as between 'specificity' and 'generality' of application in sectors. Improved security modelling is feasible via; appropriate tweaking of CIP approaches to include a wider scope of security risk management, functional responsiveness to interdependency, resilience and policy formulation requirements, and collaborative information sharing between public and private sectors.
Introduction
Critical infrastructure (CI) involves elements that are fundamental to the normal operations of the human society [1] , an can be defined as referring to any asset, system or part thereof which is critical for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social wellbeing of people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a very substantial impact as a result of the failure to maintain those functions [2] . Arguably, it may be viewed as a nation's economic "central nervous system" [3] -making it difficult for nations without a properly functional, or indeed with vulnerable CI to attain and sustain its national goals of social and economic progress and development. Examples of CIs include; Energy (electricity, oil, natural gas), Chemical, Industrial Control, Dams, Defence Industries, Emergency system interconnectedness and interactions referred to as a system-of-systems (SoS) [8] .
The growing trend for convergence and multi-system interconnectedness in CIs is introducing several security issues that threaten normal economic and social functions. As new technologies such as the Internet of Things (IoT) get integrated into CNI, new security risks (threats, vulnerabilities and attacks) emerge that require specific security solutions [9] . The risks are particularly hard to identify, and handle given that the IoT has emerged from a range of disparate fields of study [10] . The benefits of CIs can be realised if they function properly and are not impaired. This requires CIs to be kept safe from harm, and secure from any disruptive or destructive compromise. Thus, it is crucial to protect CIs, especially in the light of the growing and evolving malignity. It is important to understand potential security risks and how to effectively manage them using effective protection tools and techniques.
In the above context, the objective of protection may be explored through understanding how the attributes and capabilities of existing CI protection (security) modelling approaches fit and respond to the dynamics introduced by the evolving critical infrastructure and attack ecosystems. With the increasing adoption of IoT, it is crucial to track and understand research and development directions and outcomes, together with policy and regulatory interventions, which can better support security for critical national infrastructure (CNI) systems. CNIs provide some national benefits including; supporting the attainment of a properly functioning social environment and economic markets, enhancing service security, enabling external market integrations, and allowing service recipients (consumers, clients, and users) to benefit from new and emerging technological developments [3] . As such, their safe and resilient operation is imperative and effectively protection is required. Modelling and simulation (M&S) provide a useful technique to help achieve this. In terms of CIs, M&S provide focused methods for analysing the dynamics of CI components, evaluating the interdependency and cascading effects amongst infrastructures based on system interactions [7] . M&S uses the attributes, functionalities, operations, and behaviours of CI sub-systems to support various security analysis viewpoints, recognising and appropriately managing associated security risks. With several critical infrastructure protection approaches available, the question of how to effectively model the complex behaviour of interconnected CNI elements and configure their protection as (SoS) remains a challenge.
This study provides novel insights on the effectiveness of existing CIP approaches (tools, techniques and methodologies) to address IoT-centric security risks, in order to guide the selection, adoption and/or development of more tailored approaches. This can provide a usable reference critical infrastructure security system developers, researchers and users. This contribution is achieved via a systematic and analytical study of available CIP tools, techniques, methodologies and frameworks herein collectively referred to as 'CIP Approaches'. The extent of risk management coverage for CIP approaches and their security responsiveness to the dynamic modelling landscape are evaluated through investigating: (i) Common CIP modelling approaches, (ii) the industrial sectors most responsive to CIP modelling and simulations, (iii) the sub-stages of risk management mostly covered by existing CIP approaches, (iv) the extent to which resilience, (inter)dependency and policy formulation factors are considered in existing CIP Approaches.
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows: Section 2 presents the related work. Section 3 describes the methodology used in the research. Section 4 presents the results and discussion, while Section 5, concludes the article and outlines recommendations based on our research.
Related Works
There is also a growing recognition and acknowledgement that to effectively preserve operational continuity in CIs, resilience is a necessary protection objective to complement security capacities [11] , [12] . Resilience can be defined as the capacity to prevent, adapt, withstand and recover swiftly from both intentional and unintentional attacks [4] , [13] . There are publications [14] , [15] which emphasise that the understanding, modelling, and simulation of CI attributes, functions, operations and behaviours can support security analysis, especially given dynamicity in trends and technological adoption. Prior works [16] - [19] that have explored CIP modelling and simulation approaches does not cover newer approaches, such as the Industrial Control System Cyber Defence Triage Process (ICS-CDTP) [20] . These works also fail to address emerging needs such as resilience and support for security policy updates/formulation in modern CIs. This study takes a step towards providing some answers to fill gaps in existing literature.
Methodology
To achieve our research objectives, a systematic review approach [21] was used to identify and select related and relevant literature sources. This review technique can guarantee the quality and reliability of selected articles [22] .
Literature Gathering
Searches for relevant literature was conducted using the Web of Science (WoS) article database. WoS was chosen because of its reputation for supervised selection and inclusion of materials drawing from high-quality and high-impact indexing by humans, consistent and structured documentation, better accuracy of results, and reduced duplicates and false positives [23] . In addition, WoS is the preferred choice and standard employed by most organisations [24] . Results were restricted to peer-reviewed articles (journals, conferences, reports, books, etc.) in order to ensure quality and credibility of outcomes. Key search phrases used were: 'Critical Infrastructure Protection Tools', 'Critical Infrastructure Security Techniques', 'Critical Infrastructure Security Methodologies', and 'Critical Infrastructure Security Management Methods'. Figure 1 presents the literature gathering process-flow.
Initial search rounds using the above terms yielded a total search result of 1171 articles (represented as N) that included duplicated articles. Exclusion filtering -represented as e -was done based on titles to identify articles related to critical infrastructure protection. Unrelated articles were discarded, and only one instance each of relevant articles was retained. 303 related articles were obtained from the process, which reflected the initial selection study sample; n. However, further inclusion filtering -represented as i; was performed to narrow the contextual scope and to select the most relevant articles that support the research objectives. These incudes:
i.) Articles on theoretical developments and(or) applications of security on industrial critical infrastructures. ii.) Articles on security modelling, analysis and(or) implementation techniques or tools with use case applications in industrial critical infrastructure sectors.
iii.) Articles on security risk assessment and management techniques/methods related to critical infrastructures.
Literature Gathering Outcomes
Based on the above criteria, 131 distinct CIP modelling, simulation, and/or implementation approaches characterising software tools, techniques, methodologies, and frameworks were compiled from journal and conference articles, reports, white paper, and guidelines. These are presented in Appendix A. These spanned from 1999 to 2017 and formed the final selection study sample (Figure 1 ).
Evaluation Criteria
The sample of the CIP approaches identified were evaluated based on criteria identified to be important for classifying CIP approaches. Most of which have been used in previous works. Other criteria such as maturity and availability of CI tools were not used, although these have been used in the past [3] to evaluate CI tools. We think that there are uncertainties in accurately determining the maturity and availability status of some of the CIP tools given that they are mostly developed and used in-house, and as such this is an unreliable criterion to use. Reports and documentation on their use and effectiveness are not readily available in public domain. Similarly, whether they have been discarded, modified or upgraded, and at what point; is an information not easily available in the public domain. We think that adopting such criteria with potential for inaccurate data can greatly affect the accuracy of the overall study.
Critical Infrastructure
Type: This is considered in order to highlight the varied levels of infrastructure criticality. In the UK, some CIs are categorised 'critical national infrastructures' -CNI, perhaps because of their huge contribution to the national economy. For example, the energy sector has an unrivalled value, a failure of which can cripple the functions of other CI sectors like emergency services, communications, health and transport, thus threatening national economy, social and political order [25] .
Modelling
Technique: This is considered because it connotes foundational representation of how each protection methodology is designed and applied. Although, CIP methodologies and techniques suggest varied modelling and simulation paradigms, and purpose-driven decision-making processes, they share a common goal exploring how to manage security risks. CIP modelling techniques may be classified into; agent-based, system dynamics, empirical, network, economic, and other (equation-based, real-time simulation, and cellular automata) techniques [26] . These may also be combined with additional computational methods such as discrete time-step, continuous time-step, Monte Carlo, decision-trees, geographical information systems, event monitoring, and risk management [3] .
Risk Management:
This context is considered because it provides a useful way of evaluating and responding to security issues in critical national infrastructure contexts [3] , [16] , [27] , [28] . Most critical infrastructure protection implementations are typically based on risk management frameworks conceived as national or global standards [3] . Risk management approaches often vary either by; the nature of approach, or by how risk is measured [29] , [30] .
In this study, the 'nature of approach' is considered (nature of approach) -emphasising the criticality of assets, the potential harm that can be done to them, and the rippling interdependency effects that can affect other connected assets on the criticality chain. Thus, supported risk management substages in each CIP approach are analysed based on the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) Critical Infrastructure Risk Management framework (RMF) [4] to underscore the purpose served by each. NIPP-RMF provides the most commonly supported guidelines in security objectives, strategies, and sector coverage. It also provides reference points to a broader community of nation states and infrastructure sectors exploring the development of tailored infrastructure security methodologies, tools and techniques [4] .
NIPP-RMF suggests that risk management tools, techniques, and methodologies for CNI protection can be classified according to the purpose they serve, demonstrated by the substage(s) (Figure 2 ) of the overall CI risk management framework that is (are) supported, while applying each approach, and the associated outputs [4] . In the framework, CI elements can be physical, cyber and human. The framework also includes a process of recurrent information sharing and feedback into subsequent risk management sub-stages. Aside from the initial sub-stage of 'setting security goals and objectives', the key sub-stages of the framework used as evaluation criteria are: (i) identification of infrastructure assets, (ii) assessment and analysis of risks, (iii) risk management implementation (involving risk prioritisation, and risk control) and (iv) measurement of effectiveness. Framework [4] 3.3.4 Interdependency and Resilience: Interdependency is a condition created by direct and/or indirect interconnectedness of CIs via geographically-distributed networks and physical hardware-based channels [8] . A disruption event can then spread consequences across channels of CIs, and societytechnically called 'cascading effects' [31] , [32] . The harm from compromises can be physical, digital, economic, psychological, reputational, social and societal [33] - [35] . Since impact-flows across CI are as probable as the actual cyber-attacks themselves, it is crucial to understand the risks via modelling and simulations, in order to provide effective protection. Indeed, identifying and characterising interdependencies and complexities associated to CIs can improve the understanding of CIs as a SoS [36] - [38] . The insights that may be gained from failure and impact modelling and simulations can support the design of effective controls and response strategies [39] .
Resilience describes a capacity to stop, cope with, acclimatize to, and/or recuperate from incidents that have negative consequences [4] , [12] . With resilience in CIs, infrastructure functions, operations and services are reasonably maintained even in the face of an infrastructure disruption or compromise [33] . With attacks that cause cascades and failures, impacts can be economically and socially massive, so the need to be wellequipped to withstand and recuperate from adverse events is ever more necessary. Quite often, CI incidents happen unexpectedly, and complete control is rarely feasible. The dynamic threats and hazards landscape is such that it is hardly possible to foresee, prevent, prepare for, or control all CI security incidents, which in most cases can be unknown or emergent [33] . This necessitates a shift from the usual crisis management to resilience management to address supply chain disruptions and rapid restoration.
Appropriate readiness and recovery requires strengthening and investing in resilience to minimise sub-system vulnerabilities to restrict occurrence, intensity and propagation of failures and impacts on CIs and in turn on society [12] . It is appropriate that 'resilience' is becoming fundamental in general crisis and disaster management discourse, and is the focus of widespread efforts for resisting, absorbing, accommodating and recovering from the effects of security threats. This emphasises effort on preventive, mitigative and preparedness activities prior to a CI security crisis, response during the crisis, and the recovery after the crisis [13] . Integral dependencies and failure cascades should be considered in analysing and designing for resilience, and they should underscore the whole cycle of a CI security crisis, since it is impractical to guard against all threats [40] , [41] .
Results and Discussions
CIP approaches were analysed based on obtained information obtained about them from bibliographic literatures: reports, articles, white papers and guideline to arrive at informed insights. The list of approaches in Appendix A reflects a wide range of research being conducted in the area of critical infrastructure protection and considered relevant in the light of keeping pace with new trends like the IoT. The results of evaluating 131 CIP modelling approaches are thus presented.
Results

Common modelling techniques applied in the CIP approaches
For modelling techniques, we find that a variety of techniques are in use as shown in Figure 3 . Empirical-based modelling appears to attract the widest application with 36 (27.3%) of reviewed approaches in its favour. Looking at the risk management implementation sub-stages (prioritisation and control) in isolation, more CIP approaches (58) i.e., 44% of 131 characterised a sort of risk control implementation than risk prioritisation which had 49 CIP approaches. The 58 tools also represent 54% of the CIP approaches categorised under the risk implementation stage. Only half (29) approaches considered both risk prioritisation and control implementation stages, the remaining half considered just one of the two stages. In addition, fewer approaches consider all five sub-stages exclusively. 49% of the CIP approaches considered only two sub-stages, which most typically include: risk identification and risk assessment. Only 6 (4.5%) of CIP approaches considered all five sub-stages. 
Interdependency and Resilience considerations
Only 28, or 21%, of reviewed approaches considered elements of interdependency modelling ( Figure 6 ). Examples of approaches with explicit characterisation of interdependencies include: AIMS, Athena, CASCADE, CIPMA, CISIA, N-ABLE, NEMO, and UIS. We assume these considerations of interdependency phenomena may be connected to the core objectives for developing the tools in the first place. This may be influenced by an acknowledgement of criticality of interdependencies for both constructive and destructive impacts on CI operations. Behavioural and cascading effects of functions and failures appear to be at the core of the objectives for developing most of the listed approaches in this group.
For resilience coverage, only 18 (14%) out of the 131 CIP approaches clearly considered aspects related to resilience modelling ( Figure 6 ). 
Discussion of Findings
On a general base, a huge proportion of the sample of CIP approaches exist as either tools, techniques or methodological frameworks. The approaches seem mostly structured to handle operations and performance modelling and simulations, rather than security. However, they can also be used for securityrelated attributes such as evaluating the impact of security features or their absence with critical infrastructures. In addition, it is not clear how much of IoT performance and security are reflected in the reviewed CIP approaches. This may be because most of the approaches predate the IoT trend. A common characteristic shared by these the various CIP approaches is that they are all based on risk management, although they are distinguishable by the scope or sub-stage of overall security risk management functions considered in each approach.
We find that the common modelling techniques which receive widespread interest and adoption include: agent-based, system dynamics-based, network-based and empirical-based. These are not the only applicable techniques but only represent the most commonly used, and a quite applicable for IoT contexts too. Newer techniques may be defined from combining two or more of the above, or even entirely new modelling paradigms depending on intended development goals. The aim being to enable a multi-level modelling and simulation to meet the various requirements that may be set by IoT.
At the moment, the empirical-based model seems to be most widely employed for CIP research and the development of security approaches. This is closely followed by networkbased and system dynamics-based modelling techniques. These preferences could link to growing data-driven technology trends and reflect an increasing need to understand and evaluate CI security using real or actual historic data and drawing from expert knowledge and experiences.
For IoT-based critical infrastructures, this is good news, because IoT systems typically characterise huge volume of data from sensors connected to CI components. Empirical modelling can enable a simulation system involving the collection and dissemination of such sensor-acquired CI data and their management via a context-aware data distribution service to be used by application [42] . Potential applications include smart cloud services that can take and integrate such data with other available data (crowd-sourced or crowdsensed) to support real and high-fidelity analysis and insights. Although this will typically come with a lot of complexitiesnetworks, communications and pervasiveness that needing resolve during the modelling process. By combining sensed and historic data, it becomes easier to observe and connect the interrelationships and interdependencies among critical infrastructure components, system and sectors. Again, the few approaches mostly emerge from research institutes and academic institutions rather than government regulatory agencies. Current outlook also suggests that the domain of CIP is more characterised with self-garnered defensive solutions rather than being compliance-based mediums. This individuality and the differences in security problems and requirements can be the drivers for the development and adoption of bespoke protection techniques by infrastructure organisations.
From a multi-attribute consideration viewpoint, very few CIP approaches currently consider the combined attributes of interdependency and resilience. For example, out of 131 approaches reviewed, only CIMS, CIPMA, and IIM appear to satisfy the above criteria. Interestingly, none of these approaches applied the more common empirical or networkbased modelling techniques. Rather, these use agent-based and system dynamics modelling. This reveals the limitations of existing CIP approaches to sufficiently address the security dynamics in modern CIs. The level of multi-attribute coverage appears to be significantly low compared to the proportion of CIP approaches being developed, further suggesting a crucial need to upgrade or refine existing approaches to address any attribute deficiencies in order to improve their effectiveness.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Arguably, modelling for critical infrastructure protection seems not entirely new, as its underlying concepts typically relate to safety modelling and analysis. Only that over time, has security become relevant and emphasised due to technology trends. This has made CI sectors readily susceptible to intentional cyber-engineered attacks. Having also become so tightly coupled and interdependent, incidents show that the compromise, disruption and failure of CIs is not only restricted to causes and vectors related to natural disasters. Human-initiated actions via technology abuse or mal-interventions can be and increasingly are, an influence.
However, what seems new and perhaps not well reflected -at least directly in most of the critical infrastructure modelling and security approaches (tools, techniques, and methodologies) -is the concept of addressing 'resilience'. Most CIP approaches reviewed mainly focus on exploring concepts and phenomena related to security, reliability, dependability and risks in CIs. We reckon that a plausible reason for this may be linked to the early and more widespread emphasis on these attributes. Also, it may be attributed to the ease in defining and evaluating the above attributes compared to evaluating resilience. For example, studies [44] indicate a common acknowledgement by power company executives about a better comparative convenience for the ease of defining and measuring of CI reliability than CI resilience. Be this as it may, this apparently intractable attribute is now hihgly relevant to meeting the evolving protection needs of CI sectors.
The typical contexts that characterise the objectives for developing CIP modelling approaches -either tools, techniques or methodologies; emphasise the desire to understand the dynamic behaviours of CI systems using modelling techniques such as agent-based, system dynamicsbased, network-based, and empirical-based techniques. These techniques help to identify and characterise the causes of functional/operational anomalies and/or disruptions within CI setups through determining critical hazards and risks, their interdependencies, consequences and impact cascades. CIP should embrace modelling and analysis of security-related operations, activities and risk management, mostly within the confines of specific infrastructure environments and sectors.
In relations to how CIP is modelled, security risk management methods drive the process for gaining deeper security-related performance insights for CIs to support effective responses. Wider interests focus more on the starting sub-stages of risk management including: (i) identification of Critical infrastructure, hazards and vulnerabilities, and (ii) assessment and analysis, of security risks. Empirical-based modelling combined with risk identification, assessment, implementation and management of risk are among the most common implementation modes. These seem influenced by the growing adoption of setups and models that generate or feed-on actual scenario data to support CIP sensitivity analysis for decisionmaking.
The energy and transportation sectors demonstrate the widest concerns and efforts on protecting CNIs. This is not surprising as these sectors have higher criticalities and provide services that sustain several other sectors. Less sensitive sectors like emergency services, food and agriculture and dams need to emulate the drives and actions of the energy and transportation sectors, to ensure that they are well-equipped to handle security threats when they eventually surface. In balancing the trade-off between 'specificity' and 'generality', their key individual benefits need to be considered. Specificity allows for more focused context coverage and analysis, which can mean better and more tailored solutions, which will mean better and more tailored solutions. Conversely, generality enables a tool to be applicable to multiple CI sectors. However, a single approach -a tool or technique -cannot support holistic security modelling of CIs. A combination of multiple approaches -preferably integrated into a tool and technique (methodology or framework) -is perhaps the way to go. In addition, an approach that includes the pragmatics of implementing necessary control actions to curb security risks, as well as learning the effectiveness of controls can be a preferred solution.
Resilience modelling links to interdependency, and interdependency analysis contributes information and insights about the degree of cross-systems impact inducible by failures or disruptions. It also contributes to the perception on the level of resilience achievable in principle and practice. While some of the CIP approaches acknowledge and consider dependency or cross-dependency relationships and attributes, a larger proportion either implicitly include it or utterly overlook it. In this era of IoT, advancing technology convergence and system hyper-connectivity, understanding the interdependencies amongst CI components and systems can strongly make the difference between ignorance and knowledge on the nature, type, and degree of resilience required to enhance protection of CIs.
A significant number of the CIP approaches reviewed emerge as instruments developed by government agencies responsible for protecting CIs, or by research laboratories, for example the Idaho National Laboratory in the USA (who are also funded by the government. This could present an effective way for government and regulators to encourage a wider use of CIP approaches. However, the extent to which governmentsponsored approaches are realistically adopted in the private sectors is often unclear or in doubt, since this latter group run substantial chunks of CI systems. We posit that policies that support easy adoption of approaches are necessary in the above regard. Also, the private sector shows mixed responses to seamless monitoring and reporting of cybersecurity vulnerabilities and incidents. Even in cases where shared information, cooperation and assistance can significantly support realising acceptable protection of CIs from threats and attacks, decisions and actions are often determined by growing pressures for business competitive advantage [45] . Policies that advance and manage shared and collaborative information capability between public (government) and private sector stakeholders would be very helpful in this regard.
Clearly, security risks for CIs are evolving along new technology pathways where IoT devices and applications are finding their ways into CI systems. IoT systems are commonly characterised by; variability of scale in components, temporality of connections amongst devices, and the heterogeneity of actors. These characteristics influence conditions that can exist between periodic risk assessments without necessarily reporting on instantaneous risk impacts to the whole system. Since the risk assessment mode in existing CIP approaches are designed to operate statically periodically, they lack appropriate capabilities to address the dynamics and transient threats in IoT [30] , [46] , agree that dynamic risk assessment has become necessary. Such dynamic assessment mode would need to address this looming problem by catering for emerging system connectivity in real-time, as well as characterising, in clear and timely way, the level of temporality of devices in relations to their risk impacts.
Thus, to ensure effective; CIP modelling and simulations, sensitivity to dynamic trends, and potentially sustainable and efficient 'Living in the IoT', this study recommends that, i. Other security conscious but less-responsive critical infrastructure sectors such as emergency services, food & agriculture, and dams; should draw lessons from the efforts of the energy and transportation sectors. Analogous approaches should increase the ability to evaluate and understand security risks to attendant infrastructures and operations. They can support better understanding of any associated dependencies and cascading impacts and improve understanding of how to establish effective security and resilience. The decisionmaking processes related to measuring the effectiveness of readiness activities and investments will be improved, as well as the behavioural responses to CI disturbances or disruptions in the sectors.
ii. Newer or updated CIP modelling approaches should be developed or revised to capture scope of IoT in security risk management -from identification to effectiveness evaluations. This is to support appropriate alignments and responsiveness to the evolving trends introduced by new technologies such as IoT and IIoT. Such approaches also need to adopt dynamic and real-time assessment processes to address the issues introduced by IoT in CIs, and the high impact security risks that emerge.
iii. A strong public-private sector partnership is important and should be vigorously pursued by both stakeholder groups to achieve better security and resilience in CIs. Such collaboration can empower the public sector to monitor, in timely and efficiently ways, and to aggregate information about CI security threats, vulnerabilities, incidents and impacts as they emerge. The public sector can also provide the risk information to private sector operators to help them ensure an informed and wellorganised security management.
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